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Summary 
The central idea of public private partnerships (PPPs) is that added value can be achieved 
from greater co-operation between public and private actors. In general, the literature 
speaks of PPPs in which public and private actors develop a more or less sustainable co-
operation through which they realise products, services, or policies together, share risks 
and develop an organisation form to arrange this. The assumption is that a higher degree 
of PPP leads to more and better outcomes because public and private actors combine their 
knowledge and resources. One can find a wide array of organisational forms in which this 
co-operation is organized and the literature pays a great deal of attention to these forms. 
But is this organisational form really so important, or are the intensity and type of 
managerial strategies more important for the outcomes? Based on a large survey of 
individuals involved in Dutch environmental projects, we show that although the degree 
of PPP correlates positively with the outcomes of projects, this correlation disappears 
when we include in the analysis the number of managerial strategies employed. The 
organisational form does not have significant impact on outcomes and the conclusion we 
draw is that scholars and practitioners of public private partnerships should pay greater 
attention to the managerial efforts necessary to develop and implement PPPs.  
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1. Introduction 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have become a popular policy instrument in many 
Western European countries. Governments assume that the involvement of private actors  
vgin the provision of services, or in the realization of policy goals will increase quality 
and provide better value for money. It is believed that more intense co-production 
between public and private actors will generate better results. In the literature on PPPs, 
these benefits are typically referred to as “added value” (Osborne, 2000; Ghobadian et 
all., 2004). 
A PPP can be seen as a specific type of governance network which can roughly be 
defined as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent 
actors, which form around a policy program and/or a cluster of means, and which are 
formed, maintained and changed through series of games” (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, 
69-70). Crucial to the emergence and existence of networks are the dependency relations 
between actors (Benson, 1982). A governance network embraces all relevant stakeholders 
in the network concerning the development and/or implementation of a policy program or 
project. The concept of public private partnership specifically focuses on the interrelation 
between public and private actors and between governmental and commercial parties. 
Klijn and Teisman (2003) describe such a partnership as “more or less sustainable 
cooperation between public and private actors in which joint products and/or services are 
developed and in which risks, costs and profits are shared”. This rules out phenomena 
like outsourcing or privatization where a specific service is provided by the market on the 
basis of a preconditioned set of requirements. 
 
The concept of PPP concentrates therefore on a specific part of actor interrelations within 
the whole governance network. Dynamics in the PPP have a significant influence over 
the dynamics of the whole governance network and vice versa. For example, when a 
planning vision has been developed in the PPP network, stakeholders (NGOs, citizens, 
etc.) in the wider network may obstruct this vision and influence its subsequent 
development. According to the literature in this area, the main characteristics of PPP are: 
1. Mutual coordination of activities and daily routines: Coordination is essential for 
any partnership, including public-private ones. The activities of the public and 
private organisations have to be well co-ordinated (Mulford and Rogers, 1982; 
Faulkner, 1995) or the desired exchange of information cannot be realized (Savas, 
2000). 
2. A level of shared risk and profit sharing is needed: The co-operation between 
public and private actors has to result in at least some risk sharing, and if possible, 
in some level of profit sharing (Huxham and Vangen, 2005). Authors point out 
that profit sharing does not always have to take the form of financial profits. It 
may be that the private actors have financial profits and the public actors get 
recognizable societal benefits from the co-operation, for instance a higher quality 
of service (Audit commission, 2003; Hodge and Greve, 2005). 
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3. A form of organisational arrangement between the partners to enhance the 
cooperation process (see Savas, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005). Most 
partnerships are structured around organisational arrangements that are meant to 
simplify co-ordination and secure the shared risk and profits. These arrangements 
can take the form of an informal project group, newly established consortiums or 
other hybrid organisational forms (Faulkner, 1995; Waddock, 1991). 
The overall assumption is that the PPP enhances outcomes. To phrase it differently, if we 
see the three characteristics mentioned above as a description of the ‘degree of PPP’, one 
would expect projects with a higher degree of PPP (i.e. projects where there is more risk 
sharing, mutual coordination and organisational arrangement) to show better results than 
projects without those characteristics. After all, if that is not the case, what is the use of 
the whole discussion? 
In this article, we take a closer look at the fundamental assumption that PPPs lead to 
better outcomes. We test this using data obtained from a large survey of individuals 
involved in environmental projects in The Netherlands. The use of data related to 
environmental projects is highly relevant to the general discussion about PPP projects, 
because PPPs – at least in the Netherlands – are strongly dominated by such projects (see 
Ecorys, 2002; and Kenniscentrum 2002; 2004).  However we must acknowledge that in 
The Netherlands PPP forms like the UK PFI  partnerships which are structured by fairly 
tight contracts are relatively scarse. So although we see a lot of public private 
partnerships in The Netherlands, they tend to be more ‘loosely coupled’ in contractual 
terms at least, compared to their UK counterparts. 
In addition to the above objective, we want to explore two possible explanations for why 
some PPPs are more effective than others. In the literature two mechanisms have been 
identified as potential mediators of the relationship between PPPs and their subsequent 
outcomes: organisational characteristics (the organisational form in which the partnership 
is organized) and managerial activities (the actual co-ordination of activities within the 
network). In this article, we seek to determine which of these two factors contributes 
more to the outcome of PPPs. Our research questions thus are: 
1. To what extent does the degree of PPP employed in a project affect its 
outcomes? 
2. Which factor is more important with respect to these outcomes: the 
organisational form, or managerial effort? 
In the second section of this article, we will look at the literature on partnerships and 
discuss the assumptions that are frequently made about the effect of various 
organisational forms and managerial strategies on project outcomes. In Section 3, we will 
explain the research methodology employed. Section 4 and 5 will present an empirical 
analysis of the data and Section 6 draws conclusions and generates discussion.  
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2. PPP: exploring assumptions  
 
Under the broad definition of partnership we presented in the first section, many different 
forms of public-private partnerships can be found. We find partnerships that are 
characterized by tight organizational forms or loosely coupled forms and partnerships 
that are characterized by a principle agent relationship between public and private actors 
or by a more equal relationship (see for this: Klijn, 2010 forthcoming). An example of a 
public private partnership with a principle agent relation and strong contractual ties is the 
UK PFI partnerships where public actors use long term and detailed contracts to tender 
out both the financing, realising and maintaining of a product or service. On the other 
hand we also find joint consortia established by the partners together (tight form 
principle-principle relation) and more network like partnerships (principle-principle 
relations and more loosely coupled organizational form). In general the last two forms 
seem to be dominant in The Netherlands, although we do also find some strong 
contractual forms.
1
 
Better performance through partnerships 
However whatever form of PPP we are talking about, the assumption that a PPP leads to 
better value for money and thus better outcomes can both be found in all the government 
documents (NAO, 2002, ODPM, 2002, 2004; Kenniscentrum, 2002) as well as in the 
academic literature (Savas, 2000; Osborne 2000; Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Hodge and 
Greve, 2005). In their evaluation of a PFI (a form of PPP), established in relation to 
British schools, The British Audit Commission (2003) states that it provides a) better 
value for money, b) buys services and not things, c) provides better risk management, and 
d) leaves a long term legacy. We find the same kind of arguments in other countries, like 
the Netherlands (see Kenniscentrum, 2002).  
In general, these outcome related improvements can take several forms. The literature 
speaks mostly in terms of securing the same outcomes for lower costs (efficiency), or 
greater outcomes for the same cost (added value) (Kenniscentrum, 2002). One could 
however add a third category of innovative solutions, or solutions that have not been 
achieved before (Borys and Jemison, 1989; Faulkner, 1995; Hodge and Greve, 2005): 
- More efficiency: Partnerships and the co-operation they engender result in 
lower costs and greater efficiency (Savas, 2000; McQuiad, 2000). One 
example of this is in the area of building projects where decisions might be 
made faster. Of course, more intense co-operation implies greater transaction 
costs, which should not exceed the possible revenues (Williamson, 1996).  
- Added value: Public and private actors can add value to each other’s 
performance because their efforts enhance the value of the product or service 
that is being delivered. The classic example is that of a co-operative effort of 
drafting a master plan for a newly built neighbourhood that gives coherence to 
the total project, and thus raises the value of the individual dwellings. 
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- More innovative results; another often heard advantage of partnerships is that 
actors are able to realize better, more innovative solutions by harnessing each 
other's knowledge and expertise, (Huxham and Vangen, 2005; Parker and 
Vaidia, 2001). 
All else being equal, one would expect that partnerships involving a higher degree of PPP 
would have a better division of risks, greater co-ordination activities, and more 
organisational arrangements which would all serve to generate better outcomes.  
Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of PPP leads to better project outcomes compared to 
projects with a lower degree of PPP. 
It is implicitly assumed in the literature that PPP arrangements are necessary to address 
the more complex (societal) problems and projects involving public services. After all, 
why would one need a PPP for simple problems that can be addressed using far simpler 
tendering and outsourcing arrangements (see Kenniscentrum, 2002; Hodge and Greve; 
2005)? Neo-institutional economics stress the use of less complex arrangements 
whenever possible, (see Williamson, 1996) and one would expect a higher degree of PPP 
in projects that are more complex. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Projects that are more complex will be characterized by a higher level 
of PPP than simpler projects.  
 
PPP: towards more tightly organized forms? 
PPPs are used across a wide variety of organisational forms ranging from strongly 
contractual arrangements such as the PFI contracts in the UK and more informal 
arrangements such as project groups lacking any formal judicial status to very tightly 
organized consortiums. The discussion on the choice of organisational form is fairly 
prominent in the partnership literature, and even more prominent in the government texts 
(NAO, 2002; Kenniscentrum, 2002; 2004). However, one cannot find definitive 
statements about which organisational form is best for partnerships.  
If we look at the most prominent theoretical perspectives currently used in the PPP 
literature, namely, the resource dependency perspective and neo-institutional theory, one 
can conclude that the overall expectation is that more tightly formalised forms generate 
better results (Benson, 1982). The resource dependency perspective suggests that the 
more dependent partners are on each other, the larger the need for their interactions to be 
more formally organized (see Mulford and Rogers, 1982). Partnerships are typically 
organized because players hope to achieve added value by making their achievement of 
their goals contingent on the actions of the other partner. For this reason, partnerships can 
be said to be characterized by a high level of dependency. The same argument can be 
derived from a neo-institutional economic perspective. Partners choose to invest in the 
relationship and thus incur specific transaction costs that they cannot then deploy in 
alternative relationships (Williamson, 1996). This serves to increase both dependency and 
the problem of opportunistic behaviour. The risk of one partner behaving 
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opportunistically tends to lead to the creation of tight organisational structures in which 
partners try to minimize the possibility of the other partner walking away with a large 
share of the profits.
2
 As a result, one can expect that a high degree of PPP would be 
associated with a correspondingly high level of formalization in the organizational 
structure, and subsequently, with better outcomes. These assumptions are presented in 
Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Hypothesis 3: A higher degree of PPP is related to a more formalized and tightly 
structured PPP organisational form 
Hypothesis 4: A more formalized and tightly organized form of PPP leads to better 
PPP project outcomes. 
 
PPP and managerial strategies 
Much like the business administration literature on strategic alliances, the PPP literature 
emphasizes the importance of the managerial efforts that are made in the partnerships 
(see for instance Niederkofler, 1991, Borys and Jemison, 1989). At the same time, one 
can also recognize ideas in the PPP literature that are derived from the substantial stream 
of literature on governance. An example of this is the assumption that co-production 
between public and private actors results in the greater exchange of information and in 
the mutual sharing of knowledge. This sharing is assumed to generate better, more 
innovative products and policy outputs for complex societal problems. Although this 
literature does mention organisational structure and form (Mandell, 2001), it does tend to 
stress institutional and managerial activities or strategies as being critical to the 
achievement of good outcomes. These managerial efforts are dubbed network 
management (Mandell, 2001; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Meier and O’ Toole, 2007; 
Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). The literature on governance suggests that without these 
managerial strategies, it is difficult, indeed almost impossible to achieve desirable 
outcomes (for an overview, see O Toole, 1988; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Klijn, 
Edelenbos and Steijn, 2010)..  
The number of network management strategies that have been dealt with in the literature 
is impressive (see Mandell, 2001; O’Toole, 1988; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). It is 
clear, however, that if the network manager is to achieve significant outcomes, he has to 
implement a range of different strategies (see Mandell, 2001; Kickert et all., 1997; 
Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). In general, one can make out four different categories of 
network management strategies: connecting actors, exploring content (creating more 
variety, organizing research, exploring the perceptions of different actors etc), arranging 
the structure of the interaction (securing a temporary organisational arrangement for 
interactions) and establishing process rules (designing temporary agreements and rules to 
govern interactions) (see Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn, 2010). The literature appears to 
stress the importance of these strategies, leading one to draw the conclusion that in 
general, networks and projects that employ a number of different strategies will achieve 
better results. 
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Some scholars approach network managers as individuals who have the explicit role or 
function to manage the network (c.f. Meier and O'Toole, 2007). However, management is 
not the act of one individual exclusively. Many individuals in the network may be 
performing management activities and different people may have impact on the 
interrelations between actors and the development of collaborations (Kickert et al, 1997). 
In other words, management is an activity that can be conducted by one ore more actor 
working simultaneously. This leads us to the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5: A higher degree of PPP is related to the use of a greater number of 
managerial strategies 
 
Hypothesis 6: The greater use of network management strategies leads to better PPP 
outcomes 
 
Conclusion: organisational form or managerial strategies? 
As seen in the previous section, the literature holds a number of varied assumptions about 
PPPs and how to achieve the added value that is often acclaimed as being their result. 
Thus far, we have explored several of these assumptions and formulated hypotheses to 
test them. However, above all, our main objective is to determine whether managerial 
strategies will contribute more to outcomes than the organisational form employed.  
Partnerships involve complex decision-making processes which are characterized by 
unforeseen events. This is true not only of the strategies of the various partners involved, 
but also of the actors in the network surrounding the partnership who often become part 
of the decision-making process simply because of the fact that such partnerships are 
meant to result in societal benefits connected to the public and political life of larger 
communities. This implies that formal managerial activities as well as the improvisations 
made during the partnerships will be crucial to its success (Klijn and Teisman, 2003). 
This leads to Hypothesis 7: 
Hypothesis 7: PPP's organisational form is less critical than the network 
management strategies employed in determining the outcomes of PPP projects. 
With this last hypothesis, we can sketch the conceptual model that summarizes the 
essence of our ideas. 
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Figure 1: conceptual model of the main argument 
 
3. Methodology of the research: assessing outcomes and level of PPP 
Network management has been studied for many years (Benson, 1982; Kickert et all, 
1997; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001) and most studies on network management strategies 
are based on single or multiple case studies (for a short overview, see Agranoff and 
McGuire, 2001; Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn, 2010). Although a lot of qualitative research 
has been done on governance networks so far, the question of how network management 
strategies influence outcomes has not been thoroughly addressed. In particular, studies 
with large-enough samples are scarce. Some qualitative studies have demonstrated that 
management matters and that it has a significant impact on the process and the outcome 
of governance networks (c.f. Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006). 
However, few quantitative studies have been conducted that have sought to generalize 
this finding (for exceptions, see Meier and O'Toole, 2007; Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn, 
2010).  
In this article, we seek to generalize findings on the relationship between network 
management strategies and governance network outcomes. The use of more quantitative 
methods are very well suited to this objective. Quantitative and qualitative research are 
complementary in that the later can be used to generate interesting findings, to build 
theory, or to test specific ideas that need close examination. For example, an 
understanding of the formation and construction of network rules lends itself to 
qualitative analysis and may not be well captured by more quantitative research). At the 
same time, quantitative research can be used to test theoretical assumptions that have 
been generated by means of case research, or to detect patterns which then can be looked 
Complexity  
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Degree 
Managerial 
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Organiza-
tional form 
Outcomes  H2 
H5 
H1 
H7 
H4 
H6 
H3 
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at in greater depth. Indeed, the quantitative research in this article builds on the earlier 
qualitative work that we have done (see Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006). 
 
Respondents  
Data from projects that employ varying degrees of PPP is necessary to test our 
hypotheses. We used a data set derived from an internet survey held between December 
2006 and January 2007 that polled individuals involved in Dutch environmental projects. 
The survey yielded a large number of respondents (N=323) who were involved in 
different projects and could answer our questions about the relationships between the 
nature of the projects (the degree of PPP), the organisational form, the managerial 
strategies employed, and the outcomes of the projects.  
Although we were able to achieve a significant sample size, the problem with surveys 
like this is the absence of a complete list of all environmental projects embarked upon in 
recent years, much less a list of all the individuals directly or indirectly involved in them. 
To locate respondents, we used the database of a large knowledge organisation in The 
Netherlands called Habiforum. Professionals (practitioners, consultants, scientists) from 
the spatial domain participate frequently in this knowledge network (see also the 
appendix) 
We deliberately sought respondents who would be able to answer our questions and thus 
should have experience with these projects. Therefore they were asked to answer the 
questions for a specific project they were involved in most of their time 
Respondents were predominantly male (83.4%), middle aged (48 years) and highly 
educated (80.7% had a university degree). On average, they had 12.24 years experience 
with environmental projects and four different categories of project involvement could be 
discerned: 1) 12.0% followed the project ‘from a distance’ ; 2) 23.4% were ‘thinking 
along with the project’; 3) 35.7% ‘actively participated in the project’; 4) 28.8% were 
managing the project. We can thus see that the majority of respondents (almost 65%) 
were heavily engaged in the project they responded about in the survey.  
Respondents were found to come from four different backgrounds: 1) national civil 
servants (10.7%); 2) local civil servants (included also civil servants from counties) 
(28.5%); 3) private sector respondents (48.3%); ‘others’ (12.4%). The last group mostly 
involved respondent from stakeholder organisations like environmental groups. 
 
Characteristics of the projects in the survey 
Since each of the respondents answered the questions for a specific project, it is relevant 
to look at the characteristics of the projects. We asked the respondent how important a 
number of specific environmental aspects were in the project. We asked questions (1-5 
score from very unimportant-very important) about (for each category the % respondents 
that answered that this specific aspect was (very) important is mentioned) : 
- green development (creating new areas,  75% ); 
- road development (building new roads, reconstructing roads or expanding 
existing roads for instance from 4 till 6 lanes, 61%); 
- shopping development (building new shopping eras, restructuring existing 
areas, 31%); 
- development of dwellings (building new dwellings, restructuring existing 
ones, 62%); 
 10 
- water management and development (improving existing water management, 
creating new retention areas, etcetera, 70%). 
In general the projects we studied addressed various different environmental aspects. The 
mean number of aspects was 3.11 out of the five aspects we asked. So they were fairly 
complex projects (see further on). The median pass through time (the expected time it 
would take to implemented the project was 10 years. There was considerable variation in 
this since 21% of the projects was estimated to take less than four years whereas 31% 
was estimated to take more than 12 years. We also did ask the total and the public 
investments, but many respondents (178 out of 323) were not able to answer this and we 
therefore have to be very careful with these findings. Nevertheless, the projects are in this 
regard very heterogeneous. The smallest is 130.000 Euros, 50% of the projects  is less 
than 100 million Euros, whereas 16% of the project has a total budget of more than one 
billion.  
We turn our attention in the following section to the most important variables included in 
our analysis, namely the degree of PPP employed, content and process outcomes, project 
complexity, number of network strategies and organisational form. Control variables 
included are the phase of the project, the respondents' parent organisation, and their 
position in the project. 
 
Conceptualizing the degree of PPP 
An important variable in our research is the degree of PPP employed in the projects. This 
degree of PPP can be defined as the degree to which activities of the private and public 
partners are attuned to each other. We measured this by translating the three main 
characteristics of PPPs discussed above into three questions for our respondents. The 
respondents were asked whether: 
- organisational provisions were made with which to structure the cooperation 
between public and private parties;  
- financial risks were shared between public and private parties; 
- the coordination of activities between public and private parties was addressed 
Each item could be answered on a five point Likert scale. Using Cronbach alpha we can 
find out to what extend a set of items measures a single, unidimensional latent construct 
(Cronbach, 1951), in this case the degree of PPP. We performed reliability analysis 
(SPSS) to find out whether the three items specified above give a consistent measurement 
of the underlying theoretical construct ‘degree of PPP’. The items were found to have a 
high Cronbach’s alpha of 0.84. This implies a high internal consistency and means that 
by adding the items a scale can be constructed measuring this degree 
. We recoded the variables so that a higher score on the scale implies a higher degree of 
PPP. We then divided this score by three. The final score varied between 1 and 5, with an 
average of 3.58 Of the resulting scores, 12% were at 2 or below and 28% of the scores 
were above 4. Therefore, it can be concluded that the degree of PPP of the projects was 
relatively high. 
 
Conceptualizing and measuring outcomes: process and content outcomes 
Measuring outcomes for these fairly complex projects is not an easy feat. One of the 
reasons for this is that actors have different goals and it is difficult to pick a goal by 
which to measure outcomes for the whole project. Measuring outcomes is also 
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problematic because these projects take a long time, and the goals of actors tend to 
change over time. Goal displacement is the commonly adopted term for this which carries 
a negative connotation. The same phenomenon can be looked at in more positive terms, 
and learning is the term adopted to refer to the more positive aspects of goal 
displacement(see Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). 
Another problem we faced in our analysis is that it is not always possible to assess 
outcomes through ‘objective’ measures such as the number of dwellings realized and the 
time it takes to complete a project. We choose therefore to use perceived outcomes as a 
proxy for these. Earlier research (see Klijn et al, 2008) and the literature on governance 
(see also Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004) has stressed that one can make a distinction 
between content outcomes (e.g. how innovative or cost effective the outcomes are) and 
process outcomes (e.g. how much managerial effort it required, and how much support 
the stakeholders consequently provided). Table 1 lists indicators of the two outcome 
dimensions and the twelve items that were used to measure them. 
 
Table 1. Measurements of outcomes 
Content outcomes Items 
1. innovative character Do you think that innovative ideas were developed during the 
project? 
2. integral nature of solution Do you think that different spatial functions have been connected 
sufficiently? 
3. involvement of actors (content) Do you think that, in general, the actors involved have made a 
recognizable contribution to the results? 
4. effectiveness solutions Do you think that the solutions that have been developed really deal 
with the problems at hand? 
5. effectiveness in the future Do you think that the solutions developed are likely to be durable? 
6. Relation costs and benefits 
 
Do you think that, in general, the benefits exceed the costs of the co-
operation process? 
Process outcomes Items 
1. level of management Do you think that the actors involved have contributed substantively 
to the management of the project? 
2. conflict resolution  Do you think that conflicts and differences of opinion have been 
solved adequately during the project?  
3. deadlocks Did you witness any disturbing deadlocks during the project? 
4. productive use of differences Do you think that the actors have made use of the different 
perspectives and insights that exist in an adequate way in their 
efforts to frame the problem and find solution?  
5. contact frequency Do you think that the actors were in frequent contact with each other 
during the project? 
6. support Do you think that the outcome of the project will be supported by 
the individuals involved in its establishment? 
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A factor analysis performed on the twelve items (not included here) confirmed our initial 
opinion that there exists a clear process and a content dimension to the outcomes of PPPs. 
The Cronbach alpha of the six items measuring process outcomes is 0.80. Therefore, they 
can be assumed to form a single scale measuring the perception of process outcomes. The 
scores on these six items were added up, and divided by six. A higher score on the scale 
indicates a more positive perception of the process outcomes. The resulting scale has a 
mean score of 3.39 and a standard deviation of 0.60. Measured in a similar way, the 
Cronbach’s alpha of the six items measuring content outcomes was 0.84. The resulting 
scale has a mean score of 3.90 and a standard deviation of 0.62. In both cases, the scores 
are above the theoretical mean (3), which indicates that the respondents are generally 
positive about the outcomes. Comparing both means, it also appears they are somewhat 
more positive about the content outcomes than the process outcomes. 
 
Project complexity 
An environmental project increases in complexity as it addresses more functions and 
involves more activities. As indicated above when discussing characteristics of the 
projects five different activities were identified to be part of a typical environmental 
project. To this we added a sixth aspect where we also asked a question about (business 
development. From participant responses, we determined whether one or more of these 
activities were performed in each project . The results of this yielded a project complexity 
scale with complexity ratings ranging from 0 to 6. On average, the projects involved 3.11 
activities . However, there was wide variation in the numbers as seen by the relatively 
high standard deviation score of 1.50. 
 
Number of network management strategies 
This is an important variable and was used primarily to test Hypotheses 5, 6 and 7. 
Taking our cue from the extensive literature on network management (for an overview, 
see Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn, 2010), we used a 
measurement composed of sixteen items indicating several types of activities. For 
instance we measured connecting as network management strategy type by items as: 
‘there is satisfactory time devoted to the communication between different parties’, ‘the 
project leaders consults those implementing the project and include them in his or her 
decisions’, and  ‘It can be said that decisions making occurs collectively’ (see appendix 
for a full list of items). To measure the number of management strategies employed, we 
first dichotomized these items
3
, and then counted the number of strategies that were 
actually used in the project. The resulting variable ranged from 0 (3.6% of the 
respondents) to 16 (6.3%), with a mean of 9.11 strategies used (standard deviation 4.18). 
A significant number of respondents (99 of our 323) were not able to answer these 
questions about project outcomes (mostly because they didn’t know). This meant that the 
analysis incorporating these variables includes far fewer respondents than the 323 we 
started with. 
 
Organisational form 
To measure organisational form, we used a simple set of items distinguishing four 
different forms: no organisational form, project group, project organisation and an 
autonomous legal entity. Although these four categories do not form a continuous 
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variable, one can say that the degree of formality increases as we move from the ‘no 
organisational’ form category to the project group and joint project office categories. The 
category autonomous legal entity is the ‘tightest’ organisational form. Table 2 describes 
the distribution of organisational forms across projects as indicated by the respondents.  
 
Table 2. Respondent description of organisational forms employed (%, N=316)  
No formal organisational form 11 
Project group with regular meetings between parties 61 
Joint project office 17 
Autonomous legal entity 9 
Other forms 3 
 
From Table 2, we can conclude that the category of project group is by far the most 
popular organisational form for Dutch PPPs, followed by the joint project office and the 
autonomous legal entity forms of organisation. In 11% of the projects, there is no formal 
organisational form, and in 3% of the cases, the respondents indicated that the chosen 
form is different from any of the provided categories . The most frequently cited form 
was the project group, indicating that organisational forms are relatively loose. 
Organisational forms are related to the ‘size’ of projects, as can be seen by the fact 
organisational form is statistically significant related to the median pass time (Somers d = 
0.19). A project group is more often used for projects with a smaller median pass time, a 
joint project office and an autonomous legal entity are more often used for projects with a 
longer pass time. 
In the following regression analysis ,we will treat the ‘other’ category of the 
organizational form variabele as missing, and three dummy variables will measure the 
effect of organisational form on outcomes. 
 
4. The impact of Public Private Partnership 
According to our first hypothesis, the degree of PPP should be related to both types of 
outcomes. In the first step of the analysis, we look at whether such a relationship does 
indeed exist. Table 3 provides the results of the regression conducted to answer this 
question. We controlled for project phase, the parental organisation of the respondents 
and whether or not the respondent had a managerial position.  
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Table 3. Effect of degree of PPP on outcomes 
Model   
Process 
Outcomes 
(N=217) 
Content 
outcomes 
(N=220) 
    Beta Beta 
 Parental organisation respondent 
  
  Local 
.04 .13 
  Private 
-.01 .12 
  other 
-.12 -.05 
 Phase of the project 
  
  Development 
.01 .01 
  Executive 
.03 -.06 
  Maintenance 
.10 -.01 
  Managerial position 
.06 .14* 
  Degree of PPP 
.24** .31** 
 R
2
adj  
.09 .12 
** p < 0.01; *p < 0.05 
 
Table 3 confirms Hypothesis 1. A higher degree of PPP is clearly (and statistically 
significantly) related to both process as well as content outcomes. None of the control 
variables is significantly related to process outcomes, and managers tend to see better 
content outcomes compared to others. This, however, is only the first step in our analysis. 
In the following sections, the degree of PPP is correlated with complexity, organisational 
form and network management strategies. 
 
PPP: complexity, organisational form and managerial strategies 
Table 4 provides additional information on the relationship between complexity, 
organisational form and managerial strategies. It includes the correlation coefficients 
indicating the degree of association between PPP, complexity, managerial strategies, and 
organizational form. Organisational form is an ordinal variable and so the table lists the 
eta coefficient of this with the three other variables. 
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Table 4: Correlations between degree of PPP, complexity, organisational form and 
managerial strategies 
 PPP Complexity Strategies organisationa
l form 
PPP *    
Complexity .19** *   
Strategies .37** .03 (ns) *  
organisational form .25** .34** .10 (ns) * 
** p < 0.01 
 
We first look at the correlation between complexity and degree of PPP. This correlation 
(0.19) is clearly statistically significant. When projects become more complex, the degree 
of PPP increases, and this confirms our second hypothesis that the degree of PPP is 
higher in more complex projects. At the same time, there is also a statistically significant 
correlation between the degree of PPP, organisational form and managerial strategies. 
The higher the degree of PPP, the more managerial strategies are used. Hypothesis 5 can 
thus be accepted. There is also a statistically significant relationship between the degree 
of PPP and organisational form (eta = 0.25).  
Looking more closely at this relationship, it appears that Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. The 
degree of PPS is lowest (mean score 3.09) when there is no separate organisational form, 
and highest (4.25) when there is an autonomous judicial entity. In both cases, the degree 
of PPP lies between these two extremes (3.53 when there is a project group and 3.63 
when there is a joint project office). 
The degree of complexity is also significantly related to organisational form. A tighter 
form of organisation is chosen when the project is more complex. The joint project office 
and the autonomous judicial entity forms are more often selected in these situations. 
However, the degree of complexity is not related to the number of employed managerial 
strategies. Similarly, there is no correlation between organisational form and strategy (see 
Table 4). 
Thus we can conclude that the degree of PPP is positively correlated with outcomes and 
that both dimensions of PPP, i.e., the form and the number of strategies, are positively 
correlated with the degree of PPP. However, organisational forms and strategy are not 
related to each other. The question to tackle now is what has the most impact on 
outcomes: form or strategies? 
 
5. Which is more important: organisational form or managerial strategies? 
Now that we know how the degree of PPP relates to the organisational form and to the 
number of network management strategies, we can take a closer look at Hypotheses 4-7. 
We use a regression analysis (see Table 5), in which either process or content outcomes 
are the dependent variables and look at the various independent variables as discussed in 
the measurement section. Unfortunately, there is a relatively large number of missing 
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cases as a number of respondents were unable to answer questions related to the project 
outcomes. 
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Table 5. Regression analysis with process and content outcomes as dependent variables  
Model   
Process 
Outcomes 
(N=198) 
Content outcomes 
(N=199) 
    Beta Beta 
 Parent organisation respondent 
  
  Local 
-,03 -,01 
  Private 
-,02 ,01 
  other 
-,11 -,11 
  Complexity 
-,13 ,03 
 Phase of the project 
  
  Development 
,07 ,06 
  Executive 
,07 -,03 
  Management 
,10 ,07 
  Managerial position 
-,02 05 
  Degree of PPP 
,12 ,14* 
 organisational Form 
  
  projectgroup 
,04 ,13 
  projectbureau 
,01 -,06 
  Juridical entity 
,03 ,06 
  Number of strategies 
,53** ,49** 
 R
2
adj  
0,33 0,33 
** p < 0.05 
   
Overall, we are able to explain a relatively large amount of the variance in project 
outcomes (33%) and the results are largely similar across both outcome types. The effect 
of the degree of PPP on outcomes is much lower than that earlier (compare Table 5 with 
Table 3). In the case of process outcomes, the degree of PPP ceases to be statistically 
significant. Only the number of management strategies appears to strongly and 
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significantly affect the perceived outcomes and organisational form was not found to be 
significantly related to these. This can not be explained by the (relatively low) correlation 
between organisational form and managerial strategies. A similar analysis that was 
carried out without the managerial strategies (not included here) also shows no significant 
effects on outcomes of the dummy variables representing the organisational form. 
Therefore, Hypotheses 6 and 7 are confirmed by our analysis. Managerial strategies do 
affect the outcomes, and are (much more) important with respect to these outcomes than 
the organisational form. Further, Hypothesis 4 (about the effect of organisational form on 
outcomes) is rejected. 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
In this article, we tested the widely held assumption that projects that are characterized by 
a high degree of public private partnership generate better results. Most PPP projects in 
The Netherlands relate to infrastructure and urban development. We therefore base our 
analysis on a large survey of individuals involved in a large-scale environmental 
development project. In general, the findings from our analysis match our conceptual 
model. When projects are more complex, the degree of PPP is higher. A higher degree of 
PPP is related to a tighter organizational form, and to the use of more network 
management strategies. However, only the latter is related to the outcomes of the project. 
If we look deeper, it is striking that in general, Dutch public private partnerships 
in the infrastructure and housing area are characterized by a relatively low levels of 
formal project organization. Autonomous judicial entities make up only a small minority 
of the cases. In fact, there are more partnerships without any formal organization 
structures. This does not mean that there are no coordination activities or joint 
formulation of goals. It does also not mean that we do not see differences in the 
organizational form and the way partners are tied to each other by organizational rules, 
but it does mean that the organizational structure of Dutch partnerships is less formally 
organized. This probably contrasts with for instance UK partnerships, especially the PFI  
partnerships, which are more often cast in legally binding contracts.  
As hypothesized, we found that the degree of PPP is positively related to perceived 
outcomes. So the higher the degree of PPP, the higher the perceived outcomes. 
In examining outcomes, it is clear that it is the number of employed network 
management strategies that has the most impact on the outcome of a PPP. The 
organizational form of the partnership has relatively little impact. In fact, the positive 
correlation that exists between the degree of PPP and outcomes disappears almost 
completely when managerial strategies are factored into the analysis. This can be 
explained by the fact that improvisation and other more formal managerial activities are 
crucial to the success of a partnership 
 However, it is not our view that organizational form is completely irrelevant to 
the functioning of a PPP - only that this has little impact on its outcome. The outcomes 
are more greatly impacted by the active and intensive network management efforts in 
which the partners are connected to each other, new content is explored and the 
environment of the project is actively managed. 
 
We are not surprised by the lack of relation between organizational form and managerial 
strategies. These partnerships operate in a complex environment and are characterized by 
dynamic decision-making processes. Any manager and initiator of such a PPP project has 
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to perform managerial activities no matter what organizational form the partners have 
chosen for their cooperation. From our perspective, this is the reason why organizational 
form does not contribute to the outcomes. 
The findings of this study provide practitioners who tend to spend great lengths of time 
on the form of their partnerships with something weighty to think about. It similarly 
provides important insights that would contribute both to governmental and academic 
discussions on partnerships. Great emphasis has been traditionally placed in these 
discussions on the organizational forms of partnerships. Still, as different it is from the 
writings in the literature and in the professional discourse, this finding is not entirely 
novel. If you ask a good manager involved in a PFI contract in the UK what determines a 
project’s quality, he will tell you that it is the management o f the contract, keeping good 
relations and generally doing a good job. If you absolutely need the contract, you are 
already in trouble. So in that sense we suspect that our findings, although they are found 
in a context of  Dutch PPP’s which have a slightly less contractual character, are also 
relevant for most ‘families’ of PPP. 
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Appendix 
 
Population and survey 
The table below describes the population we have used for our survey, and the number of 
respondents that have returned usable questionnaires. 
 
Table 1. Population and Survey 
Number of people on the Habiforum List 
(after deleting academic researchers) 
1592 
Returned questionnaires   547 
Analyzed questionnaires  323 
 
We were interested only in practitioners who had been directly involved in the project. 
The original list obtained from Habiforum contained 1592 names that were usable after 
removing academic researchers. An e-mail was send in November 2006 to these 
addresses, with a (secured) link to a webpage containing the questionnaire. We knew 
beforehand that this list included many people with only a broad interest in spatial 
projects and without ‘real’ involvement in such a project. Therefore, one of the first 
questions of the questionnaire was what specific project the respondents were involved 
in. This was done in hopes of selecting only those responses that had been filled out by 
people involved in the projects. In total, we received 547 responses, but many of these 
were incomplete. In fact, 188 people did not provide any information about an 
environmental project they were involved in. They simply quit the survey after reading 
questions about these projects. We therefore deleted these respondents from the database. 
We also had to delete 36 other respondents from the dataset, because they did not respond 
to questions regarding key variables. This process left with 323 respondents who 
answered most (but not all) questions in the questionnaire and indicated that they 
themselves were involved in environmental projects. The final response rate was 
estimated at 21%.The limited response rate suggests that a degree of caution is necessary 
in interpreting our data as: a) the actual population of people involved in environmental 
projects is unknown and b) it is impossible to find out whether our participants are 
representative of this population. Nontheless, because of the importance of the 
Habiforum network in the Netherlands, we have sufficient reason to believe this sample 
provides a reasonable overview of all environmental projects in the Netherlands (see note 
3) 
 
Project and respondent characteristics 
Items to measure network management strategies 
We used 16 items to measure network management strategies in this paper. The table 
below presents the items that were used. 
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Table items for management strategies 
1. relevant public groups are involved via the organized forms of negotiation and 
discussion platforms  
2. relevant private groups are involved via the organized forms of negotiation and 
discussion platforms  
3. relevant civil action groups are involved via the organized forms of negotiation and 
discussion platforms  
4. In every new phase of the project, new parties are sought out and new connections 
developed in this way.  
5. In this project, as great an effort as possible has been made to make different opinions 
visible and to include then within the decision making process 
6. In this project, satisfactory attention has been paid to the exchange of views between 
individuals with differing standpoints 
7. During the process of collecting information, sufficient emphasis has been placed upon 
the development and establishment of common points of departure and information needs 
8. Satisfactory levels of attention were paid in this project to involving external 
parties/people that can bring new ideas and solutions to the debate 
9. There is satisfactory time devoted to the communication between the different parties 
10. The project leaders consults those implementing the project and includes them in his or 
her decisions. It can be said that decision making occurs collectively 
11. The project leaders in this project considers the relationships between parties and 
persons, their basis, and how they have developed and are developing  
12. The project management seeks to bring opposing interests closer together in the event 
of deadlocks and serious disagreements. 
13. IExplicit agreements are made in relation to the organisational form of cooperation 
(project groups, steering groups etc.) to be carried out within the project. 
14. Sufficient attention is paid in the early stages to establishing rules for managing 
conflict. 
15.  Allowances have consciously been built into project-related agreements for deviations 
from the plan if such a deviance is found to be advantageous.  
16. The withdrawal of parties from the project is possible, if this is necessaryto protect 
their interests .  
 
 
Project and respondent characteristics as control variables 
Besides variables that measure the main concepts, we included in our analysis several 
control variables related to both respondent and project characteristics .  
 
Phase of the project 
The phase of the project is known to influence the relation between PPP and outcomes. 
For instance, almost by definition, there will be fewer outcomes in the first phases of a 
spatial project. From the responses to our survey, we can identify four distinct phases: 1) 
preparation phase (21%); 2) developmental phase (41%); 3) building phase (17%); 4) 
maintenance phase (21%).
4
 We include three dummy variables in our analysis, with the 
preparation phase serving as the reference category. 
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Parent organisation of the respondent  
The respondents hail from distinctly different backgrounds and this may have a clear 
bearing on their perception of outcomes. Therefore, we control for this in the analysis. 
Four different backgrounds can be discerned: 1) national civil servants (11%); 2) local 
civil servants (including counties and water board) (29%); 3) private sector respondents 
(48%); ‘others’ (13%). The last group comprises mainly respondents from stakeholder 
organisations like environmental groups Three dummy variables were created to include 
the backgrounds in the analysis. National civil servants serve as the reference category. 
 
Position in project 
The perception of outcomes can also depend on the position of the respondent within the 
project. Given our interest in the effect of managerial strategies, we included a dummy 
variable in the analysis that distinguishes those in managerial positions (28.8%) from 
those without such a position. 
 
 
Endnotes  
                                                 
1
 And some of these known (PFI like) projects (there are only a few of them in The Netherlands so far) are 
also in our sample. Since we asked our respondents to answer the questions for a specific project they are 
most involved in which they had to fill in the questionnaire we have an overview of all the projects of the 
survey.  
2
  On the other hand, there are also arguments against too tight and well organized partnerships. The 
most important argument comes from the neo-institutional economics framework that puts forth the view 
that the act of organizing, whether by extensive contracts or organisational structures is costly in that it 
implies significant transaction costs (Williamson, 1996). It can also diminish the freedom of the partners to 
act (Hazeu, 2003). 
3
  This is supported by the fact that the reliability analysis conducted on the sixteen 5-point Likert 
items showed very high levels (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90). This suggest strongly that the sixteen items make 
up a single scale. However, a dichotomization of the scores is called for in order to measure the number of 
employed strategies. Scores 1 and 2 indicated that the strategy was used, and these were both re-assigned a 
score of 1. The other three categories were assigned scores of 0. 
4
  Note that we did not ask respondents in which phase they were, because that might generate 
confusing. We listed a number of activities (from initiating ideas, till implementation of actual maintenance 
activities) and deduced the phase from the level of activities based on the answers. 
